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CASE NOTES
It appears likely that the Illinois courts will soon be called upon to
decide whether or not a wife may sue her estranged husband in the tort
action of rape.2 1 The action is being brought on the authority of our
present decision. It seems inconceivable that the Illinois courts will sus-
tain any such action. Our present decision cannot be cited as a precedent
authorizing the courts to completely disregard all marital privileges.
However, it must be concluded that our present decision has opened
the way in Illinois to a new body of tort law which will certainly bring
many more interspousal disputes into the courts, especially where the
parties are divorced at the time of bringing suit as in the present case.
LABOR LAW-RIGHT TO COMPEL REDELIVERY OF
UNION SHOP CARD
Plaintiff, a local barbers' union, sought to compel the redelivery of a
union shop card which had been supplied to the defendant, a barber shop
proprietor. The shop card identified defendant's place of business as a
"union shop" and it had been accepted by the defendant as union prop-
erty subject to recall for violation of union rules. Defendant was not
only an employer of other barbers, but he also worked as a barber in his
own shop. The union brought this suit to recover the shop card on the
grounds that the defendant refused to join the union and pay dues as a
"non-active member," such refusal being in violation of union rules.1
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dismissed the suit and re-
fused to compel return of the card. Di Leo v. Daneault, 109 N.E. 2d 824
(Mass., 1953).
The Di Leo case represents the latest interpretation of a provision re-
cently added to the constitution of the International Barbers' Union.2
The constitutional provision requires that proprietors working "with
the tools of the trade," join the union as "non-active" or "proprietor"
members. Such a "non-active" membership would require the proprietor
21Chicago Daily Sun-Times § 1, p. 3, col. 3 (Feb. 11, 1953).
I For decisions holding that an attempt to unionize employers is a lawful and
proper labor objective see: Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293
(1943); Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N.E. 2d 12 (1947); Coons v. Journeymen
Barbers, Etc., 222 Minn. 100, 23 N.W. 2d 345 (1946); Naprawa v. Chicago Flat
Janitors' Union, 315 I11. App. 328, 43 N.E. 2d 198 (1942); Swing v. A.F. of L.,
298 Ill. App. 63, 18 N.E. 2d 258 (1938).
Contra: Dinoffria v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters and Chauffeurs,
331 111. App. 129, 72 N.E. 2d 635 (1947); Ellingsen v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union,
377 Il1. 76, 35 N.E. 2d 349 (1941); Meadowmoor Dairies v. Milk Wagon Drivers'
Union, 371 111. 377, 21 N.E. 2d 308 (1939); Carlson v. Carpenter Contractors' Ass'n.,
305 I11. 331, 137 N.E. 222 (1922); Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608, 52 N.E. 924
(1898); Rest., Torts § 814 (1939).
2 The Journeymen Barbers, Hairdressers and Cosmetologists' International Union
of America. This constitutional provision became effective Jan. 1, 1948.
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to pay dues and assessments, but would not entitle him to vote or hold
office in the union. The penalty for a shopowner's refusal to join is the
removal of the shop card and consequential striking and picketing by his
union employees in accordance with the union's express laws. It is in-
tended by the union that the threat of such a penalty will act to persuade
the employer union member to pay his dues.
The court, although recognizing the union's rights in the shop card,
placed emphasis on the reasons why the union desired possession of the
cards. It stated that the main concern of the union was the effect it an-
ticipated from the withdrawal of the card. The court concluded that the
union's object of compelling financial support through the coercive
power of an equity decree was contrary to the public policy of the
state, and thus unlawful. In arriving at its decision, the court thought it
unnecessary to even consider the fact that the union membership was
without full privileges.8
On prior occasions, where the courts have been called upon to con-
sider the identical provision of the union's constitution, they have em-
ployed the unlawful purpose doctrine as applied in the Di Leo case to
enjoin the union from. removing the card from the shop.4 Thus in the
case of Riviello v. Journeymen Barbers,5 in addition to applying the un-
lawful purpose doctrine, the court held that to coerce an employer to
accept "sterile" and "inactive" membership with rights inferior to the
employee members would also be an unlawful labor objective. It should
be noted that the court in the Riviello case, contrary to the Di Leo case,
placed emphasis on the fact that the union membership offered was with-
out full privileges. However, as in the Di Leo case, the court was pri-
marily concerned with the illegal result of the union conduct.
This approach was also adopted in Wisconsin Employ. Rel. Bd. v.
Journeymen Barbers, Etc.,6 where the court relied upon equitable prin-
ciples in holding that it would enjoin the union from coercing the em-
ployer to join. The court had before it a constitutional provision iden-
tical to that of the Di Leo case. It held that the union was committing
unfair labor practices in attempting to force a proprietor to become a
member of and contribute to the financial support of the union by the
payment of initiation fees and dues.
3 Simon v. Journeymen Barbers, Etc., 21 N.J. Super. 65, 90 A. 2d 753 (1952).
4 Riviello v. Journeymen Barbers, Etc., 240 P. 2d 361 (Cal. 1952); Foutts v.
Journeymen Barbers, Etc., 155 Ohio St. 573, 99 N.E. 2d 782 (1951); Rainwater v.
Trimble, 207 Ga. 306, 61 S.E. 2d 420 (1950); Wisconsin Employ. Rel. Bd. v. Journey-
men Barbers, Etc., 256 Wis. 77, 39 N.W. 2d 725 (1949).
5240 P. 2d 361 (Cal., 1952). The court made it clear that if the employers were
guaranteed full and equal rights of membership with the other members of the
union, the objective of the union's conduct would be lawful. See also James v.
Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P. 2d 329 (1945).
6256 Wis. 77, 39 N.W. 2d 725 (1949).
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However, in a recent Ohio decision, the court, rather than viewing the
union's conduct as a means to a labor objective, the lawfulness of which
was to be determined by its purpose,7 treated the removal as a discon-
tinuance of the union's recommendation of approval to the public.8 The
court concluded that equity will not enjoin the removal of a union shop
card where the party displaying the card has no contractual right to con-
tinue its display, and is no longer either recommended or approved by
the union.
The dissenting opinion of the same case9 applied the equitable unlaw-
ful purpose doctrine, reasoning, as in the later Di Leo case, not in terms
of an agreement or property rights, but in the light of the important
anticipated results. The dissent argued that the proprietor should not be
branded as non-union and be put out of business because of his unwilling-
ness to pay tribute to the union which will not admit him as an active
and bona fide member.
The decision of the Foutts case finds support in Rainwater v. Trim-
ble,10 which also refused to examine the significance of the removal of
the shop card in the light of the unlawful purpose doctrine. Instead, the
court stated that the original agreement permitting removal was "plain
and unambiguous, . . .which should be binding unless it is in contraven-
tion of some rule of law."" Finding no applicable law or statute, the
court denied an injunction against removal of the shop card.
It is well to note that such union conduct as exemplified in the above
cases is opposed to the policy of the Taft-Hartley Labor Relations Act,12
which prohibits labor organizations from engaging in concerted activi-
ties, th; purpose of which is to force or require any employer or self
employed person to join any labor or employer organization. One should
be mindful, however, that this act applies only to businesses engaged in
interstate commerce.
It seems clear that the labor unions have come to use the shop card as a
coercive tool. It serves as the union's manifestation of approval of a labor
7 Foutts v. Journeymen Barbers, Etc., 155 Ohio St. 573, 99 N.E. 2d 782 (1951);
Crosby v. Rath, 136 Ohio St. 352, 25 N.E. 2d 934 (1940); Rest., Torts § 775 (1937).
8 Foutts v. Journeymen Barbers, Etc., 155 Ohio St. 573, 99 N.E. 2d 782 (1951).
9 Ibid., at 582, 787. "The real issue in this case does not involve the mere right
to remove a so-called shop card which is the physical property of the ...union.
The real issue involves that which is symbolized by the removal of the shop card."
At 588, 790, the dissent continued, "The excuse given for such cause of action is ...
the unwillingness .. .to pay tribute by way of dues to an organization in which
he is denied anything but nominal or sterile membership. Authorities need not be
cited that extortion is illegal. That a court of equity should intervene to prevent
such course of action is manifest."
10207 Ga. 306, 61 S.E. 2d 420 (1950).
11 Ibid., at 307, 421.
12 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 141
(Supp., 1947).
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employer to the sympathetic public; its purpose is analogous to the union
label affixed to union produced goods. Therefore, it is well to note, that
similar to the ruling in the Di Leo case, the union label can not be with-
held from an employer to accomplish an unlawful labor objective, even
though it be conceded that the union has a property right in the label. 3
Moreover, the withdrawal of the shop card is an indication of the union's
disapproval of an employer, similar to the disapproval achieved by picket-
ing. Peaceful picketing, analogous to the union label and shop card situ-
ation, has also been conditioned upon a lawful labor objective. 14
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the present case seems
to have handled the conduct of the Barbers' Union more satisfactorily
than any previous decision. The case seems to indicate a future disposal
of such cases on truly equitable grounds. Although acknowledging the
union's contract and property rights in the card, the court still insisted on
restricting this union's withdrawal of its shop cards to instances in which
the objective to be accomplished by such withdrawal would be lawful.
The reasoning of the court is fully applicable to the analogous rules gov-
erning union labels and picketing. The courts have come to a realization
of the great strength and influence of labor unions, and have insisted
as in the present case that labor shall not bring about the ruination of
employers who refuse to submit to arbitrary rules having little bearing
on the functions of organized labor.
PROPERTY-SIGNATURE CARD SIGNED BY BOTH PARTIES
NECESSARY TO CREATE JOINT TENANCY
IN BANK ACCOUNT
Plaintiff brought an action against the executors of her husband's will
to recover money deposited in a bank on the ground that it was a joint
account and that she had survivorship rights. The evidence showed that
the now deceased husband opened the account in his name alone. No
changes were made in the form of the account until shortly before his
death, at which time he directed the assistant cashier to write the name
of the plaintiff after his name. At the deceased's direction, the cashier
wrote above both names: "Payable to either of them or survivor with
full survivorship rights." No signature card or other agreement was
signed at that time or subsequently by either the deceased or the plain-
tiff. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled
to the deposit by right of survivorship due to her failure to comply with
the Illinois Joint Rights and Obligations Statute,' which requires both
isConnors v. Connolly, 86 Conn. 641, 86 At. 600 (1913). Contra: Saulsberry
v. Coopers' International Union, 147 Ky. 170, 143 S.W. 1018 (1912).
14 Teamsters' Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S.
306 (1926); Outdoor Sports Corp. v. A.F. of L., 6 N.J.L. 217, 78 A. 2d 69 (1951);
Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N.J.L. 729, 65 At. 165 (1906).
'Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 76, S 2.
